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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD J. MADSEN, ELVA E. MAD-
SEN, EUGENE JOHNSON, FREYA 
JOHNSON, JACK JOHNSON, ESTHER 
JOHNSON, ALBERT L. ANDERSON, 
JANIS B. ANDERSON, PERRY L. 
EEN, LO;LA R. EEN, ERMA SMITH, 
and LEWIS W. SMITH, 
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CHARLES W. GIBBS COMPANY, a cor- I 
poration; MARY GODBE GIBBS; 
LUANA SALISBURY; 0. CLARE I 
BREINHO·LT; FLORA P. MASO·N; and 
ANNIE M. TAGGART, ? 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I 
I 
-vs.-
I 
I DAVIS COUNTY; EUGENE TOLMAN, THOMAS AMBY BRIGGS, and CLYDE 
B. ADAMS, individually and as members 
of the Board of Commissioners of Davis 
County; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
OF THE SOUTH DAVIS WATER IM-
PROVEMENT DISTRICT; FRANCIS 
T. MAYO, JOSEPH H. WOOD, and j1 
ALMOREAN BAGLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8482 
Brief of Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are the owners of real property located 
within the corporate limits of North Salt Lake, a munici-
pal corporation, and also within the boundaries of the 
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South Davis Water Improvement District, an improve-
ment district created under the procedures set forth in 
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Chapter 
29, I.jaws of Utah, 1953). They brought this action for 
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their con-
tinued inclusion within the South Davis Water Improve-
ment District, and to enjoin the District from taking 
actions that would subject plaintiffs' property to liability 
for the obligations of the Water Improvement District 
(R. 1-5). Davis County, its Commissioners, and the mem-
bers of the Board of Trustees of the South Davis Water 
Improvement District were joined as parties defendant. 
Davis County and the Board of Trustees of the South 
Davis Water Improvement District moved to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that it did not state 
a claim upon which relief might be granted (R. 10, 12). 
The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and 
for Davis County, Honorable Charles G. Cowley presid-
ing, granted the motions to dismiss (R. 26), and on 
December 28, 1955, entered an order dismissing the plain-
tiffs' Complaint (R. 28). It is from that order that this 
appeal is taken (R. 29). 
On X oYember 22, 1955, counsel for the defendant 
submitted to the court a:ffidaYits from some of the parties 
plnintiff that they ''haYe been more fully advised of the 
facts and it is no\\T their desire that they be 'Yithdrawn 
as party plaintiffs.'~ The affidaYits "Tere :filed on behalf 
of Clifford J. 1\ladsen, ElYa E. J[adsen, Eugene Johnson, 
Frt\ya Johnson, J ark Johnson, Esther Johnson, .L\..lbert 
L. Anderson, Janis B. Anderson, Perry L. Een, Lola R. 
Een, Erma Smith, and Le,Yis Smith (R. 14-19). There-
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upon counsel for the remaining plaintiffs moved the 
court to drop the named parties as plaintiffs in this action 
(R. 21). Although this motion has not been heard nor 
decided, the named plaintiffs have not joined in this 
appeal and are not considered appellants herein. Inas-
much as the invalidity of a state statute is being asserted 
in this action, notice of the action was given to the Attor-
ney General of the State of Utah pursuant to 78-33-11 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 24). The State of Utah 
was not joined as a party. 
The case having been disposed of below on a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim against the moving 
defendants, the facts alleged in the Complaint are taken 
to be true for the purposes of this appeal. The Complaint 
shows that the County Commissioners of Davis County 
on about May 7, 1954, created the South Davis Water 
Improvement District. At that time the property of 
plaintiffs' was not located within the boundaries of any 
incorporated city. On or about April1, 1955, the property 
belonging to plaintiffs was annexed by North Salt Lake 
pursuant to the provisions of 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 (R. 2). North Salt Lake did not join in the creation 
of the South Davis Water Improvement District, as it 
might have done under the statute, but continued to 
operate its own system for the distribution of water to 
the inhabitants of the town. The town will continue to 
operate its own water works system, and in connection 
with the operation of that system will assert a right to 
make the plaintiffs contribute to the maintenance of the 
system by way of taxes levied by the municipal corpora-
tion (R. 2). 
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Under the provisions of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, water improvement districts have 
the power to cause taxes to be levied on real property 
located within the boundaries of the district. The Board 
of Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement Dis-
trict intends to exercise this power of taxation and to 
cause taxes to be levied against the property of the plain-
tiffs. The taxes so levied will be used to support the 
water distribution system to be constructed, operated, 
and maintained by the District (R. 2). 
Plaintiffs in this action requested the Board of 
Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District 
and the Board of Commissioners of Davis County to take 
action to exclude the plaintiffs' property from the Im-
provement District. Both of these defendants, however, 
refused to take any such action and claimed that under 
the statutes of the state-particularly Title 17, Chapter 
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953-neither of them, nor both 
of them together, had any power to exclude property 
once it was included within the district (R. 3). Upon 
this refusal, and the indication of the improvement dis-
trict that it was going ahead 'Yith the sale of bonds and 
the incurrence of obligations affecting plaintiffs' prop-
erty, this action was brought. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The complaint states a claim upon '-rhich relief 
can be granted under the proYisions of the Utah Declara-
tory tTudgments Act. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD J. MADSEN, EL,VA E. MAD-
SEN, EUGENE JOI-INSON, FREYA 
JOHNSON, JACK JOHNSON, ESTHER 
JOHNSON, ALBERT L. ANDERSON, 
JANIS B. ANDERSON, PERRY L. 
EEN, LO,LA R. EEN, ERMA SMITH, 
and LEWIS W. SMITH, 
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CHARLES W. GIBBS COMPANY, a. cor- I 
poration; MARY GODBE GIBBS; 
LUANA SALISBURY; 0. CLARE t' 
BREINHOLT; FLORA P. MASON; and f. 
ANNIE M. TAGGART, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
DA VIS COUNTY; EUGENE TOLMAN, 
THOMAS AMBY BRIGGS, and CLYDE 
B. ADAMS, individually and as members 
of the Board of Commissioners of Davis 
County; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
OF THE SOUTH DAVIS WATER IM-
PROVEMENT DISTRICT; FRANCIS 
T. MAYO, JOSEPH H. WOOD, and 
ALMOREAN BAGLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8482 
Brief of Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are the o"\vners of real property located 
within the corporate limits of North Salt Lake, a munici-
pal corporation, and also within the boundaries of the 
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South Davis Water Improvement District, an improve-
ment district created under the procedures set forth in 
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Chapter 
29, Laws of Utah, 1953). They brought this action for 
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their con-
tinued inclusion within the South Davis Water Improve-
ment District, and to enjoin the District from taking 
actions that would subject plaintiffs' property to liability 
for the obligations of the Water Improvement District 
(R. 1-5). Davis County, its Commissioners, and the mem-
bers of the Board of Trustees of the South Davis Water 
Improvement District were joined as parties defendant. 
Davis County and the Board of Trustees of the South 
Davis Water Improvement District moved to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that it did not state 
a claim upon which relief might be granted (R. 10, 12). 
The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and 
for Davis County, Honorable Charles G. Cowley presid-
ing, granted the motions to dismiss (R. 26), and on 
December 28, 1955, entered an order dismissing the plain-
tiffs' Complaint (R. 28). It is from that order that this 
appeal is taken ( R. 29). 
On November 22, 1955, counsel for the defendant 
submitted to the court affidavits from some of the parties 
plaintiff that they "have been more fully advised of the 
facts and it is no\v their desire that they be \Yithdrawn 
as party plaintiffs.'' The affidaYits \Yere filed on behalf 
of Clifford J. l\1:adsen, Elva E. l\fadsen, Eugene Johnson, 
Freya Johnson, Jack Johnson, Esther Johnson, Albert 
L. Anderson, Janis B. Anderson, Perry L. Een, Lola R .. 
Een, Erma Smith, and Lewis Smith (R. 14-19). There-
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upon counsel for the remaining plaintiffs moved the 
court to drop the named parties as plaintiffs in this action 
(R. 21). Although this motion has not been heard nor 
decided, the named plaintiffs have not joined in this 
appeal and are not considered appellants herein. Inas-
much as the invalidity of a state statute is being asserted 
in this action, notice of the action was given to the Attor-
ney General of the State of Utah pursuant to 78-33-11 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 24). The State of Utah 
"\Vas not joined as a party. 
The case having been disposed of below on a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim against the moving 
defendants, the facts alleged in the Complaint are taken 
to be true for the purposes of this appeal. The Complaint 
shows that the County Commissioners of Davis County 
on about l\fay 7, 1954, created the South Davis Water 
Improvement District. At that time the property of 
plaintiffs' was not located within the boundaries of any 
incorporated city. On or about April1, 1955, the property 
belonging to plaintiffs was annexed by North Salt Lake 
pursuant to the provisions of 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 (R. 2). North Salt Lake did not join in the creation 
of the South Davis Water Improvement District, as it 
might have done under the statute, but continued to 
operate its own system for the distribution of water to 
the inhabitants of the town. The town will continue to 
operate its own water works system, and in connection 
with the operation of that system will assert a right to 
make the plaintiffs contribute to the maintenance of the 
system by way of taxes levied by the municipal corpora-
tion (R. 2). 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under the provisions of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, water improvement districts have 
the power to cause taxes to be levied on real property 
located within the boundaries of the district. The Board 
of Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement Dis-
trict intends to exercise this power of taxation and to 
cause taxes to be levied against the property of the plain-
tiffs. The taxes so levied will be used to support the 
water distribution system to be constructed, operated, 
and maintained by the District (R. 2). 
Plaintiffs in this action requested the Board of 
Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District 
and the Board of Commissioners of Davis County to take 
action to exclude the plaintiffs' propert3T from the Im-
provement District. Both of these defendants, however, 
refused to take any such action and claimed that under 
the statutes of the state-particularly Title 17, Chapter 
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953-neither of them, nor both 
of them together, had any power to exclude property 
once it was included ''Tithin the district (R. 3). Upon 
this refusal, and the indication of the improvement dis-
trict that it was going ahead "\Yith the sale of bonds and 
the incurrence of obligations affecting plaintiffs' prop-
erty, this action was brought. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The complaint states a claim upon "\Yhich relief 
can be granted under the provisions of the Utah Declara-
tory Judgments Act. 
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2. The complaint states facts upon which plaintiffs 
would be permitted to prove that the continued inclusion 
of their property within the improvement district violates 
rights guaranteed them by the ''equal protection'' cia use 
of the United States Constitution and the "uniform 
operation" clause of the Utah Constitution. 
3. The complaint states facts under which plaintiffs 
\vould be permitted to prove that the continued inclusion 
of their property within the improvement district violates 
the right guaranteed to them by Article XI, Section 6, 
of the Utah Constitution, to have North Salt Lake pre-
serve, maintain and operate a waterworks system. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANT'ED UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT. 
The record does not show, and the court did not 
indicate, the basis upon which it ruled that the plaintiffs' 
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. However, because of the arguments pre-
sented below, and in view of the general rules of pleading 
in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellants 
concluded that the court's objection to the complaint was 
based on substantive grounds. 
Paragraph 8 of the complaint states that there is a 
controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendants 
concerning the construction of statutes relating to the 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
powers of boards of trustees of improvement districts 
and boards of county commissioners, particularly with 
referenee to exclusion of property from improvement 
districts. Paragraph 9 of the complaint, construed in the 
light of other paragraphs in the complaint, shows a con-
troversy between plaintiffs and defendants over the 
validity of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, insofar as it affects the property of the plaintiffs. 
The prayer in the complaint asks for a declaration of 
rights, specifically with reference to the validity of the 
creation of the Improvement District under Title 17, 
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the powers of 
the Board of County Commissioners and the Trustees 
of the District to exclude plaintiffs' property from the 
South Davis Water Improvement District. Paragraphs 
1, 5 and 6 of the complaint show that the plaintiffs have 
valuable property and other rights which will be affected 
by the declaration. 
It is provided in Section 78-33-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, that 
'' .L\._ny person in teres ted under a deed, will or 
w·ritten eontract, or "-hose rights, status or other 
legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may ha\e deter-
mined any question of construction or \alidity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." 
'rhat deelnratory judg-ments are Yery frequently used 
to deter1nine questions as to the construction and Yalidity 
of statutes eannot be denied. ''The contest as to Yalidity 
6 
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often arises between governmental authorities who need 
the clarifying therapy against a challenging or recalci-
trant official or board whose cooperation is required.'' 
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed). p. 774. The 
declaratory judgment action is frequently used to deter-
mine the scope of powers and duties of public officers 
and commissions. Id. at 795. Surely the complaint in 
this case sets forth a "justiciable controversy" and such 
an interest in the plaintiffs that a declaration as to their 
rights would be valuable. 
Notwithstanding the generally accepted VIew that 
the declaratory judgment is an alternative remedy and 
is available even though a different type of action may 
be brought (Gray v. De fa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251 
[1937]), it is recognized that there are situations in 
which because of a particular statutory remedy it may 
be held that a declaratory judgment should not be 
granted. For example, where a statute provides a 
''special form of remedy for a specific type of case'' it 
may be proper to deny declaratory relief as is done under 
the Pennsylvania act cited in Borchard, Declaratory 
Judgments (2d Ed.), p. 346. 
The reason for such a rule is apparent. Where the 
legislature provides that certain matters will be heard 
only in particular ways or before particula·r tribunals, 
the legislative intent would be defeated if litigants were 
permitted to have the matters heard in a different man-
ner. With reference to the creation of improvement 
districts, it is true that there is in Utah a statute which 
provides a ·''special form of remedy for a specific type 
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of case.'' It is not true, however, that the remedy is 
provided for this specific type of case. The statutory 
section in question is 17-6-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
''Any property owner who shall have filed a 
written protest, as hereinbefore provided, and 
\vhose property has been included, notwithstand-
ing such protest, may within thirty (30) days after 
the adoption of the resolution establishing such 
district, apply to the district court of the judicial 
district in which such county is located for a writ 
of review of the actions of the board of county 
commissioners in so establishing such district, but 
only upon the ground that his property will not 
be benefited by the proposed improvements or 
upon the ground that the proceedings in establish-
ing the district have not been in compliance with 
the provisions of this statute. A failure to apply 
for such a writ of review within said time shall 
foreclose all owners of property within said dis-
trict as so established from the right to further 
object thereto.'' 
Object whereto~ In Yiew of the narrow issues which 
can be presented to the district court under this statu-
tory '' \vri t of review'', Yiz., ''benefit'' and ''statutory 
procedure,'' can it be Yalidly argued that it was the 
legislative intention to prevent property O"\\rners from 
raising any questions as to the Yalidity of the statute, 
corresponding rights of ri ties and districts, and the 
application of the statute to particular persons when 
there has been a drastic change in circumstances subse-
quent to the date of the hearing and the time in which 
the writ of re\~ie'v could haYe been taken f The complaint 
in the instant case does not parellel the \vrit of review. 
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This is a ne\v case. It has new issues and a much broader 
scope than anything that could have been presented to a 
district court under the statutory procedure. It is con-
ceded that the provisions of 17-6-3 prevent property 
owners within an improvement district from bringing a 
declaratory judgment action, subsequent to the period 
of limitations provided in that section, to determine 
whether the county commission correctly decided the 
question of benefit, or to determine whether the county 
commission and the improvement district followed the 
statutory procedure in establishing such a district. How-
ever, that is all it prevents; and litigants who have a 
justiciable controversy relating to the validity of the act 
or its application to new situations, may properly bring 
an action for a declaratory judgment. (For a general 
discussion of the relation of declaratory judgment acts 
to statutory proceedings see Borchard, Declaratory 
Judgments [2d Ed.], pp. 342 et seq.) 
See also Deer Park Civic Association v. City of Chi-
cago, 347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952), wherein 
the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to test the 
validity of a zoning ordinance. It was shown that prior 
to adoption of the ordinance the owners of the property 
in question had received a building permit for construc-
tion contrary to that which plaintiff thought permissible 
under the ordinance. After issuance of the permit, the 
plaintiff did not appeal to the zoning board of appeals, 
as required by current procedures. Thereafter a new 
zoning ordinance was passed which permitted the con-
struction of buildings in the manner provided by the 
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building permit. The court held that the plaintiff was 
not barred from declaratory relief, saying, "When the 
amendment became effective a question of law arose, 
determination of which is beyond the power of the Board 
of Appeals. We think the plaintiff did not lose the right 
to bring this suit because they did not appeal to the 
Board.'' 
Adoption by this court of the view that the provi-
sions of 17-6-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 prevent the 
granting of declaratory relief in actions of this type 
would not of itself cure the error committed by the 
district court in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. The 
court should have entered a declaratory judgment even 
if it was convinced that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
the specific declaration it asked for. The general rule 
relating to the sufficiency of a complaint in an action for 
I 
a declaratory judgment is stated in Anderson, Declara-
tory Judgments, p. 275, as follows: 
''A declaratory complaint will not be dismissed 
because the court disagrees with the construction 
of the contract involved, contended for by the 
plaintiff. A complaint in an action for declaratory 
relief which recites in detail the dispute between 
the parties and prays for a declaration of rights 
and other legal relations of the parties, states 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, 
against a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of 
the complaint.'' 
In 1l/ aguz~re et al. r. Hibernia Sa r£ngs cf Loan .A .. sso-
ciat?:on, 23 (~~ll. 2d 719, 146 1"). 2d 673 (1944), the Supreme 
Court of (~alifornia \Yas required to rule directly on 
whether a complaint might be dismissed if it showed on 
10 
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its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to a favorable 
declaration. The court, after reviewing the decisions on 
the point and adopting the rule as stated by Anderson, 
supra, held that the complaint states a cause of action 
whether or not the pleader states facts sufficient to show 
he is entitled to a favorable declaration. 
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court 
of Oregon in Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove et al., 170 
Ore. 256, 130 P. 2d 1013 ( 1943). This was an action for 
a declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiffs as 
members of the State Highway Commission in which it 
was alleged that there was a controversy between the 
City and the State Highvvay Commission as to the Com-
mission's authority to maintain barricades in certain 
areas. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the com-
plaint. Reversing, the court said: 
''It is entirely clear that the complaint alleges 
a justiciable controversy both a.s to the city and 
the property owners, and the contention of want 
of jurisdiction is without merit. * * * This being 
so, it is also clear that the complaint states facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the 
declaratory judgment law. 'It is rare that a de-
murrer is an appropriate pleading for the de-
fendant to file to a petition for a declaratory judg-
ment,' City of Cherryvale v. Wilson, 153 Kan. 505, 
510, 112 P. 2d 111, 115. The test of sufficiency of 
such a complaint is not whether it shows that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights in 
accordance with his theory, but whether he is 
entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Even 
though the plaintiff is on the wrong side of the 
controversy, if he states the existence of a contro-
versy which should be settled by the court under 
11 
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the declaratory judgment law, he has stated a 
cause of suit.'' 
In considering the circumstances under which a com-
plaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this court has held that if under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of his claim as pleaded in 
the complaint, the plaintiff might be entitled to relief, 
a motion to dismiss should not be granted. Liquor Con-
trol Commission v. Athas, ______ U. ______ , 243 P. 2d 441 
( 1952). This holding conforms with the generally ac-
cepted rule under federal practice. 2 Moore's Federal 
Practice, para. 12.08. Although the court in Liquor Co.n-
trol Cimmission v. Athas was not considering a complaint 
based on the Declaratory Judgments Act, the decision is 
applicable to all civil actions. The holding there, when 
read with the authority cited above concerning the suffi-
ciency of complaints for declaratory judgments, indicates 
that the complaint in this case should not have been dis-
missed if, under any state of facts provable under it, 
the plaintiffs could show a justiciable controversy be-
tween them and the defendants concerning the validity 
or construction of the statutes relating to the creation 
of improvement districts. The complaint does show a 
justiciable controversy, and the case should be reversed 
and remanded to the district court for a declaratory 
judgment as to the rights and legal relations of the 
parties. 
12 
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II. 
THE COMPLAINT STATES FACTS UNDER WHICH 
PLAINTIFFS WO·ULD BE PE.Rl\flT'TED T'O PROVE THAT 
THE CONTINUED INCLUSIO·N OF THEIR P'RO·PERTY 
WITHIN THE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT VIOLATES 
RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE "EQUAL PR.O~ 
TECTION" CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE "UNIFORM OPERATION" CLAUSE 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Complaint allege 
that the property owned by plaintiffs is located within 
both the boundaries of the South Davis Improvement 
District and the boundaries of North Salt Lake, and that 
both the Improvement District and the Municipal Cor-
poration claim the right to supply the plaintiffs with 
water. The above paragraphs also allege that both of 
the political subdivisions claim the right to tax plaintiffs 
for the support of a water distribution system. Para-
graph 9 of the complaint alleges that plaintiffs' location 
within the boundaries of the two political subdivisions, 
and their exposure to the taxing power of the two political 
subdivisions, violates Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution and Amendment XIV, Section 1, of 
the United States Constitution. The paragraph further 
alleges that by virtue of the operation of provisions of 
the statute relating to the selection of trustees, these 
constitutional provisions are violated again. 
The statute providing for the creation of improve-
ment districts for water, sewers or sewage systems was 
drafted without reference to county or municipal boun-
daries. It was intended to permit areas with similar 
water or sewage problems to create improvement dis-
13 
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tricts. In 17-6-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 it is provided 
that the area of any district created under the statute 
''may include all or part of any county or counties, in-
cluding all or any part of any incorporated municipali-
ties, other incorporated areas, and unincorporated areas 
as the needs of the inhabitants of the proposed districts 
may appear." The statute recognizes that there are 
different problems as to representation of the govern-
ing body of the improvement district when municipalities 
are included within the district's boundaries. If an in-
corporated municipality is contained entirely with an 
improvement district that also includes other territory, 
the governing body of the municipality is entitled to name 
a resident of the municipality as a member of the board 
of trustees of the district ( 17-6-3.1). If the boundaries 
of the district and the boundaries of the municipality 
coincide, the board of trustees is comprised of the gov-
erning body of the municipality. The act also provides 
for the election of members of the board of trustees at 
the time that the bond election is held. Section 17-6-3.1 
goes on to provide : 
''In voting on the question of the issuance of 
the proposed bond, none but such qualified voters 
as shall haYe paid a. property tax in the district 
in the year next preceding the election shall be 
permitted to vote, but in voting on the election of 
trustees all qualified voters ·in the district outside 
the corporate lhnits of any municipality or incor-
porated area shall be permitted to vote." (Em-
phasis added.) 
These sections show that persons living in munici-
palities, all of which are included "Tithin an improvement 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
district are represented on the board by appointees of 
their municipal officers, and that persons living outside 
of the municipalities, only part of which are located 
within the boundaries of improvement districts, are 
represented by no one. The municipal officers are not 
permitted to appoint a trustee, and the property owners 
are not permitted to vote for a trustee. That is the 
situation of the plaintiffs in this action. 
Quaere, whether there is any reasonable basis for 
providing for representation of the board of trustees for 
all persons whose property is within an improvement 
district except those persons whose property also lies 
within a municipality, part of which is located within the 
improvement district~ Were a statistician to examine 
the Utah cases on "unreasonable classification" from the 
standpoint of a quantitative analysis only, he would 
probably conclude that the classifications established by 
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are 
reasonable, have a basis for differentiation, and are not 
arbitrary, since it is true that the Utah cases have 
predominantly upheld legislation attacked as denying 
equal protection or not having uniform operation. 
If course, we as lawyers, rather than statisticians, 
know that the quantum theory of decision making is not 
foolproof. The factual situations presented to the court 
relating to the reasonableness of legislative classifications 
are so disparate that singly they are inconclusive. It is 
signficant, however, that even those cases upholding 
legislative classifications are careful to point out that 
the classification must be reasonable and that there must 
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be a basis for differentiation between the classes estab-
lished by the legislation. The cases also held that in 
determining whether a classification is reasonable, the 
court must consider the objects and purposes of the act. 
State v. JJfa,son, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920 (1938). A 
reading of the Utah cases, together with the general 
rule as to classifications, can be of some help in deter-
mining the types of situations in which classifications 
are upheld or overturned. Many of the cases upholding 
the legislative classifications have been concerned with 
classi:fica tions of businesses and persons engaged in 
business. State v. Mason, supra, involved the classifica-
tion of businesses for licensing purposes. State v. J. B. 
and R. E. Walker,. Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2d 766 (1941), 
involved the classification of businesses under an act 
requiring the payment of wages in a certain manner. 
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939 (1943), 
upheld a classification of businesses for purposes of ap-
plication of the Sunday closing law. Other cases in which 
the classification adopted by the legislature has been up-
held as against attack under the ''uniform operation'' 
and ''equal protection'' clauses are State v. Packer Cor-
poratio1t, 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 (1931), involving 
the prohibition of certain advertising on billboards but 
not in newspapers and magazines; nr allberg v. Utah 
Public Welfare Co1nmission, 115 Utah 242, 203 P. 2d 935 
(1949), differentiating between a husband and wife 
living together and a husband and wife living apart for 
purposes of a welfare lien; Slater t\ Salt Lake City, 115 
Utah 476, 206 P. 2d 153 (1949), involYing classification 
under a law .. prohibiting the distribution of literature on 
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the streets of a municipal corporation; Davis v. Ogden 
City et al., 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616 (1950), involving 
a distinction between employed and self-employed law-
yers for tax purposes; Tygesen v. ~Magna Water Com-
pany, 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127 (1950), involving the 
classification of newspapers for purposes of publishing 
notices under the 1949 act relating to improvement dis-
tricts; Han.sen v. Public Employees Retirement System 
Board of Administration et al., ______ Utah ______ , 246 P. 2d 
591 ( 1952), involving a classification of employees based 
on the number of years of service under a retirement 
act; and Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P. 2d 213 (1955), in-
volving a classification of types of workers and contrac-
tors under the employment security act of Utah. 
There have been a number of cases, however, 1n 
which the courts have been unable to find a reasonable 
relation between the classifications established by the 
legislature and the objects and purposes of the legisla-
tion. Among these are Board of Education v. Hunter, 48 
Utah 373, 159 Pac. 1019 (1916), wherein a classification 
for tax rate purposes based upon the assessed valuations 
of cities of the first and second class was held invalid ; 
Lyte v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 90 Utah 369, 
61 P. 2d 1259 (1936), in which a law permitting a dif-
ferent method of filing charges under the Liquor Control 
Act than under general criminal law was held to include 
an unreasonable classification; and State v. Packard, _____ _ 
Utah ______ , 250 P. 2d 561 (1952), invalidating an "indus-
trial peace" statute which applied different rules to 
17 
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strikes called by ''nationally recognized unions'' than 
those called by ''other unions.'' 
Probably the most similar Utah case is Toronto v. 
Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P. 2d 594 (1950), involving 
a provision in the Utah Statute of Limitations which 
barred actions accruing after a certain date but not 
those which accrued before that date. The case might 
be described as one in which there was an ''unconscious 
classification,'' for it is probable that the distinction 
between the two classes of cases would not have been 
made if the legislature had been more careful in its 
draftsmanship. Notwithstanding this, the act required 
a construction that the classes were there, and since in 
view of the objects and purposes of the act there was no 
reason for making the distinction between the earlier 
and the later transactions, the legislative classification 
was held invalid under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and under Amendment XIV, Section 1, of 
the United States Constitution. It is possible that in the 
present statute the legislature, if it had thought about 
it, would have provided for a vote by property owners 
whose property lies within an improvement district and 
also within a municipal corporation, part of "\Yhich is 
within the improvement district. But the act is clear 
that such persons are not entitled to vote and the courts 
nre not permitted to add "\Yords or phrases where it is 
not clear what the "rords or phrases should be. 2 Suther-
land, Statutory Construction, § 4924: Cra,vford, Statu-
tory Construction, § 201. 
The act is written in such a manner that there is a 
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classification, for purposes of elections of the board of 
trustees. This classification has no reasonable relation 
to the purposes of the act. Certainly there is a reason-
able relation between the purposes of the act and the 
classification of the areas which participate in the for-
mation of the district into municipalities and county 
areas. There is also a reasonable relation between the 
purposes of the act and the method of representation of 
these classes of individuals on the boards of trustees. 
But there is no reasonable relationship between the 
purposes of the act and the deprivation of the right of 
representation to the small class of people in plaintiffs' 
situation. 
If the act by its terms creates one classification which 
is unreasonable, by its silence it creates another. This 
classification is between persons living in municipalities 
\vhich join in an improvement district at the time it is 
formed, and persons living in an area annexed by a 
municipality after having been included in the improve-
ment district. In the first case it is reasonable to sup-
pose that the municipality conducts its affairs with 
reference to the operations planned by the improvement 
district and that to the extent that the improvement dis-
trict provides \Vater or sewage services, the operations 
of the city will be that much lessened. In the instant 
case, because of the gap in the statute the plaintiffs are 
exposed to the actions of two political subdivisions. They 
are caught, so to speak, in a tug-of-war between North 
Salt Lake and the South Davis Water Improvement Dis-
trict. Both want to give water services. Both want to 
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tax for them. Both 'vant to charge for them. And the 
plaintiffs are the ones vvho have to pay. 
We are not unmindful of the cases which hold that 
the burden is upon the person attacking the legislative 
classification to show that the classification is unreason-
able. But the burden cannot be met without an oppor-
tunity to meet it. Surely, the requirement relating to 
the burden of the plaintiff refers to something more than 
a requirement that the person attacking the legislative 
classification be the most convincing in an argument on 
the subject. There are a number of facts, receivable in 
evidence, which would have a bearing upon the reason-
ableness of the legislative classification. In this action 
the appellants would like to have an opportunity to 
present facts and to meet the burden placed upon them. 
By the action of the trial court in dismissing the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim the opportunity was 
never there. We submit that the court erred in dismissing 
the complaint and that it should have heard the case on 
its merits and made a determination as to whether the 
act is unconstitutional as depriving the plaintiffs and 
appellants of their rights under the "uniform operation" 
clause of the Utah Constitution a.nd the "equal protec-
tion" clause of the United States Constitution. 
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III. 
THE COMPLAINT STATES FACTS UNDER WHICH 
PLAINTIFFS WO'ULD BE PERMITTED TO PROVE THAT 
THE CONTINUED INCLUSION O·F THEIR PROPERTY 
WITHIN T'HE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT VIOLATES 
THE RIGHT GUARANTEED TO THEM BY ARTIC:LE XI, 
SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, TO HAVE 
NORTH SALT LAKE PRESERVE, MAINTAIN AND 
OPERATE A WATERW~)RKS SYSTEM. 
Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that the opera-
tion of a water distribution system within the corporate 
limits of North Salt Lake violates Article XI, Section 6, 
of the Utah Constitution, in that it derogates from the 
duty of the municipality to preserve, maintain and 
operate its waterworks for supplying water to its in-
habitants at reasonable cost. 
Article XI, Section 6 provides : 
''No municipal corporation, shall directly or 
indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any 
waterworks, water rights, or sources of water 
supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled 
by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and 
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter 
to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall 
be preserved, maintained and operated by it for 
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges : Provided, that nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to prevent any such municipal 
corporation from exchanging water-rights, or 
sources of water supply, for other water-rights 
or sources of water supply of equal value, and 
to be devoted in like manner to the public supply 
of its inhabitants." 
Although the rule frequently has been announced 
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that the legislature has almost plenary powers to create 
and control municipal corporations, cases recognizing 
this rule have also recognized that the power of the 
legislature with reference to municipal corporations is 
often limited by specific constitutional provision. See 
Wadsworth et al. v. Sa.n.taquin City et a.Z., 83 Utah 321, 
28 P. 2d 161 (1933). 
No cases have been found interpreting the extent 
to which Article XI, Section 6, Utah Constitution, limits 
legislative power to affect water systems of municipali-
ties; but it has been said that the provision was meant 
to be a prohibition on the legislature as well as on the 
municipality. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & 
Electric Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 Pac. 672, 678 (1902). 
It will be conceded, we think, that under this section 
the legislature would be without power to enact legisla-
tion either directing or empowering a municipal corpora-
tion to dispose of its waterworks system, or to dispose of 
water rights \Vithout receiving in exchange other water 
rights of equal value. It seems reasonable to suppose, 
also, that the legislature is without power to enact legis-
lation prohibiting a municipal corporation, or municipal 
corporations generally, from preserving, maintaining 
and operating waterworks; or from supplying water to 
inhabitants at reasonable cost. 
The statute in question in this case does not purport 
to restrict the right and duty of municipal corporations 
to preserve, maintain and operate waterworks; nor does 
it purport to empower the municipalities to alienate their 
waterworks, rights or sources. The statute purports only 
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to authorize the creation of improvement districts and 
to permit the participation of municipalities in the dis-
tricts when it is in the interest of the municipality to 
participate. If that were all that the statute did, it would 
be, under past decisions of this court, unobjectionable 
(Tygesen. v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 
127 [1950], Freeman v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P. 
2d 174 [1954] ). But in determining the validity of the 
application of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, to the town of North Salt Lake, consideration of 
the situation of the municipality and the practical effects 
of the legislation is mandatory, for it is not what this 
statute purports to do but what it does that will have the 
greatest bearing upon its constitutionality. It has been 
held repeatedly that a legislature cannot do indirectly 
what it is prohibited from doing directly. 
Because of the contiguity of the South Davis Water 
Improvement District and the town of North Salt Lake, 
both of which will operate water systems, and the over-
lapping of their boundaries, it may be expected that 
there will be competition between them with reference 
to the right to supply water to property owners. It is 
common knowledge that the ability of an operator to 
carry on his operations economically may depend upon 
the extent to which he is able to control charges for his 
services; and that the ability to control charges is fre-
quently lost in a competitive situation. 
Depending upon the size of its water system, the 
density of demand, and the prices chargeable, it may be 
that the town of North Salt Lake, by virtue of the opera-
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tions of the South Davis Water Improvement District, 
will not be able to ''preserve, maintain and operate'' its 
waterworks for supplying its inhabitants with water at 
reasonable charges. The extent to which the town has 
grown, the amount of water available for growth, the 
size of its water distribution system, and the geography 
of the area-together with the methods of operation and 
charges of the improvement district-all will have an 
effect upon the ability of the town of North Salt Lake 
to operate its water system. 
It may be argued that this is conjecture, and that 
there is no evidence in the record to show that the water 
system of the town of North Salt Lake will be adversely 
affected by the operation of the South Davis Water Im-
provement District. The argument would be true but 
not valid. There is no evidence in the record relating 
to the effects of the legislation because the court below 
dismissed the complaint without having given the plain-
tiffs an opportunity to present evidence. The complaint 
alleges that the town will continue to operate its system, 
that both the town and the district will operate in the 
area wherein lies plainiffs' property, and that the opera-
tion of the district will derogate from the town's consti-
tutional duties. 
That the provisions of Article XI, Section 6, were 
adopted for the benefit of the inhabitants of municipal 
corporations is apparent from a reading of the section 
itself; and if not from that, then from the section's 
history. The framers of the Utah Constitution regarded 
the water systems of municipal corporations as being 
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held "in trust" for the inhabitants of the municipal 
corporations. 1 Proceedings, Constitutional Convention 
of 1895, pp. 669 et seq. The "beneficiaries" have the 
requisite standing to question the validity of the legis-
lation. 
In view of the reasonably foreseeable effects of the 
establishment of water improvement districts in areas in 
which they compete with the water systems of municipal 
corporations, the pleadings raised questions of fact 
having a bearing upon a determination of the validity 
of the creation of this improvement district. For that 
reason the court should not have dismissed the complaint 
but should have heard the matter and decided it on the 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The complaint in this action contained allegations 
which, fairly construed, show a justiciable controversy 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. This being 
so, it was error for the court to dismiss the complaint 
as failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Moreover, the complaint raised questions of a 
constitutional nature, resolution of which was dependent 
upon consideration of facts surrounding the creation 
and operation of the South Davis Water Improvement 
District. Consequently, in view of the broad provisions 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to "notice 
pleading" and the policy in favor of determinations of 
the merits, the court erred in dismissing the complaint. 
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It is submitted that the complaint does state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, that there are factual 
issues to be determined, and that the action of the court 
below should be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
BRYCE E. ROE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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